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2Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the fiscal characteristics of the new
members in the light of the requirements of the SGP and the criticisms levelled
against the Pact and to see in what ways their initial conditions differ from those
faced by the current euro zone countries in the run-up to the adoption of the
euro. Overall, because of the lower debt levels and greater yield convergence
already achieved, the new members will be able to rely less on gains from yield
convergence than the current euro zone members were able to do. EU accession
will also have a negative net impact on the budgets of the new members in the
early years of membership. We also look at the cyclical sensitivities of the budgets
and find that in the new members the smoothing capacity of the automatic
stabilizers might be weaker than in the current euro zone members. Beyond these
general characteristics, we also emphasize that there are large differences in the
starting fiscal positions of the new members. Some of the policy implications of
our findings are discussed.
JEL Classification numbers: E61, H6, H87
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4I. Introduction
The ten new Members States (NMS)1 of the European Union (EU) have to
comply with the budgetary objectives stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty (MT) and
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), and are subject to the EU budgetary
surveillance framework including, where relevant, the activation of the Excessive
Deficit Procedure (EDP). However, as long as they have not adopted the euro,
the NMS will not be subject to the so-called enhanced budgetary surveillance
under the EDP, nor to the sanctions foreseen for the members of the euro zone2.
The NMS have the obligation to adopt the euro and to meet the Maastricht
criteria of public finance, inflation, interest rate and exchange rate. As soon as they
meet these criteria, they are supposed to introduce the euro and to become a full
participant of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
The purpose of this paper is to examine the fiscal characteristics of the new
members in the light of the requirements of the SGP and the criticisms levelled
against the Pact and to see in what ways the initial conditions of the NMS differ
from those faced by the current euro zone countries in the run-up to euro
adoption. The paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly summarizes the
main features and criticisms of the SGP, as well as the principal proposals for
improvement of the Pact found in the literature. Section III examines the fiscal
characteristics of the NMS from the perspective of meeting the Maastricht criteria
on the road to euro adoption and from the broader perspective of the SGP
framework. This section ends with a summary of our findings. Section IV
discusses some of the policy implications of our findings.
II. The Stability and Growth Pact
1. Features
The SGP and its rules are well known and well documented and we briefly
recall only its main features and the rationale behind them3. A unique feature of
the euro zone is that monetary policy is centralized in the hands of the European
Central Bank (ECB) while fiscal policy remains decentralized in the hands of the
governments of the individual member states. It was therefore recognized that to
support the ECB’s responsibility to maintain price stability and to prevent free-
riding, fiscal policy had to be subject to rules in order to ensure discipline of
public finances. These rules consist of two pillars. First, a Members State’s general
government deficit/GDP ratio cannot exceed 3 percent and its general
government debt/GDP ratio cannot exceed 60 percent; in case the latter ratio is
exceeded, the country has to demonstrate that its debt is being reduced and
approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace. Second, Member States
                                             
1 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia.
2 For a description of the EDP, see Gros et al. (2004) and Cabral (2001).
3 A good description of the SGP and how it works can be found in Gros et al. (2004), Fatás et al.
(2003), HM Treasury (2004), European Commission (2000, 2002, 2003) and ECB (1999).
5have to respect the medium-term budgetary objective of ‘close to balance or in
surplus’ in order to allow for normal cyclical fluctuations, while keeping the deficit
within the reference value of 3 percent of GDP. The 3 percent reference value for
the deficit can be breached only under exceptional circumstances, when the excess
results from an unusual event outside the control of the Member State and which
has a major budgetary impact, or when it results from a severe economic
downturn, defined as an annual fall of real GDP of at least 2 percent. A smaller, at
least 0.75 percent decline in GDP, can be considered as exceptional taking into
account the abruptness of the downturn and the accumulated loss of output
relative to past trends.
It is a legitimate question to ask how the reference values of 60 percent of
GDP for the government debt and 3 percent of GDP for the fiscal deficit were
chosen. It has been suggested (Thygesen, 2002) that 60 percent was the average
debt ratio of the EU members around 1990 (the MT was signed in 1992) and if
countries kept their deficit at the 3 percent limit, their debt would converge to 60
percent, assuming that nominal GDP is rising at a trend rate of approximately 5
percent per year: 3 percent real growth (assumed to be the potential output
growth in the EU) plus 2 percent inflation (in line with the ECB’s inflation target
of 2 percent or less). While these reasonings have not been made officially public
as far as we know, it is widely assumed that they lay behind the selection of the
reference values.
2. Criticisms of the SGP
The main criticisms levelled against the SGP can be grouped under the
following headings on the basis of what the Pact is seen as lacking: strong enough
analytical foundations, symmetry, flexibility, incentives for good quality fiscal
consolidation, and enforceability4. We discuss these in turn below.
a) Lack of clear analytical foundation
A frequently mentioned criticism which seems to have dented the most the
credibility of the SGP in the eyes of academics is that its main provisions lack a
clear analytical foundation. The rationale behind the ‘close to balance or in
surplus’ rule is debt sustainability, which means that the government cannot run a
Ponzi scheme where debt grows forever, but it has to satisfy its intertemporal
budget constraint, that is to say, the present discounted value of its expenditures
must equal the present discounted value of its revenues. However, as pointed out
by Perotti et al. (1997), debt sustainability thus defined is of little practical use,
since the intertemporal budget constraint has an infinite time horizon that does
not sufficiently constrain government policies: anything can be assumed about the
future. The intertemporal budget constraint depends on GDP growth, inflation
and real interest rates, but the SGP does not take into account the differences in
these areas across countries. Typically, catching-up economies such as the NMS
have higher potential growth and higher inflation due to the Balassa-Samuelson
                                             
4 There is a good review of the criticisms of the SGP in Buti et al. (2003a).
6(BS) effect, which is an equilibrium phenomenon5. Thus, catching-up economies
could, ceteris paribus, run higher deficits than more developed countries without
jeopardizing the long-term sustainability of public finances.
Furthermore, the SGP does not address the critical issue of what is the
optimal level of debt and treats low and high debt countries identically. Implicitly,
the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ rule over the cycle means that eventually the
debt will be run down to zero. Zero debt may not be an optimal solution since it
ignores the benefits of the intergenerational distribution of taxes to finance, for
example, infrastructural investments and reforms in the pension and health care
systems that will benefit future generations6. The optimal level of debt depends,
inter alia, on whether the interest payments on the debt crowd out worthwhile
investments and whether the disincentive effects of higher distortionary taxes to
cover the interest payments are important or not (Aiyagari and McGrattan, 1998).
From that perspective, low debt countries have more room for maneuver than
high debt countries. The uniform deficit rule does not take into account the higher
need for infrastructural investments in countries where the initial stock of public
capital is insufficient, as in the catching-up NMS. Furthermore, the uniform
reference value of the debt does not explicitly take into consideration the
contingent liabilities due to population ageing and the state of pension reform that
can vary from one country to another.
A further criticism from an analytical standpoint is that the SGP disregards the
aggregate fiscal stance of the euro area. In a monetary union, what matters from
the point of view of macroeconomic stability is the fiscal stance of the union as a
whole and not the fiscal stance of individual countries. The fiscal policies of large
countries have a greater impact on the fiscal stance of the union than the fiscal
policies of smaller countries.
b) Lack of symmetry
Two issues are relevant under this heading. First, for countries which have not
yet reached the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ position, the requirement that they
reduce continuously the deficit may entail procyclical policies in an economic
downturn. This problem has been mitigated by the European Council decision of
March 2003, specifying that the above requirement will be judged on the basis of
the cyclically adjusted budget position. However, countries which have not yet
reached the 3 percent deficit level and are therefore outside of the euro zone have
to satisfy the Maastricht reference value in nominal and not cyclically adjusted
terms in order to be able to adopt the euro. In the run-up to the euro zone, these
countries may therefore confront a situation in which they have to follow a
procyclical policy. Second, while the SGP sets a limit on the maximum deficit and
                                             
5 Kovács (2004) reports estimates in the literature of the BS effect that vary from less than one
percent to up to 6.9 percent per year, and von Hagen and Zhou (2004) report estimates varying between
about 2 and 4 percent. 
6 Buiter and Grafe (2002) make the intriguing point that the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ rule could
possibly mean that the EU governments will become net creditors. This would lead to the ironic result of
the (partial) socialization of the means of production in the long-run, as governments will have to invest
their cash surpluses in bonds and stocks of the private sector. Here we note that running a surplus in
normal times was originally intended for countries with high debt ratios (above 60%) and therefore the
government becoming a net creditor in the long-run is more a theoretical possibility than a real threat.
7foresees penalties for breaking it, the Pact does not specify surpluses and does not
otherwise provide enough incentives for reducing the deficit and/or accumulating
surpluses during boom periods. The failure of sufficiently reducing the deficits in
the upswing of 1998-2000 is seen as the major reason for the breaking of the
deficit criterion by several Member States in 2002 and 20037.
c) Lack of flexibility
The loss of independent monetary policy within the euro area calls for the
preservation of fiscal flexibility to cope with asymmetric shocks or the asymmetric
effects of common shocks. This means that countries should have enough room
to let the autonomic stabilizers operate fully or, if necessary, to use discretionary
policy to respond to shocks. The question then is whether the 3 percent deficit
reference value provides the needed flexibility. The answer to this question
depends on the starting level of the deficit and the output smoothing capacity of
the automatic stabilizers. Some studies have found (Eichengreen and Wyplosz,
1998 and Kiander and Virén, 2000) that the deficit limit might not provide enough
flexibility for some of the EU-15 countries.
d) Quality of fiscal consolidation
The quality of fiscal consolidation matters because taxes and expenditures
affect output differently due to their different impact on income distribution and
incentives. Empirical research has demonstrated that consolidation relying on
current expenditure cuts rather than tax increases are likely to last longer and are
thus more successful (Alesina and Perotti, 1995 and 1997; Perotti et al. 1997; Buti
and Sapir, 1998; von Hagen et al. 2001). The SGP, by defining the fiscal target in
terms of deficit numbers, neglects the quality of fiscal adjustment. Von Hagen et
al. (2001) provide empirical evidence that high debt to GDP ratio and weak
domestic and international economy induce governments to undertake
expenditure-based rather than revenue-based consolidation strategies. This proves
that governments will undertake quality adjustment under economic constraints,
but the SGP does not explicitly provide incentives for undertaking quality
consolidation.
e) Enforceability
The major criticism in this area is that the fines and penalties foreseen within
the SGP framework are difficult to enforce, because the decision to subject a
country to the penalties lies in the hands of the Economic and Financial Affairs
Council (ECOFIN) which is composed of politicians who are more understanding
of and therefore more indulgent toward the problems faced by their peers. The
decision of November 25, 2003 to hold the EDP for France and Germany in
“abeyance for the time being” is an unmistakable sign of such indulgence. The
frequent recourse to one-off measures and creative accounting has also
undermined the seriousness of the enforcement procedures. Most importantly, the
long time lags involved in the enforcement procedure mean that the penalties,
even if enforced, will come too late to trigger timely responses. Prior to the third
stage of EMU, there was an incentive to adjust in order to join the currency union,
                                             
7 See Fatás et al. (2003).
8but having adopted the euro that carrot disappeared and the stick remains of
dubious efficiency.
3. Proposals for improvement found in the literature
There have been many proposals for improvement of the SGP and even its
usefulness has been questioned (De Grauwe, 2002)8. Nonetheless, there is broad
consensus among academics and opinion makers that as long as fiscal policy
remains decentralized, there is a need for fiscal rules in the euro area. Buti et al.
(2003a) review the EU fiscal rules against the criteria of Kopits-Symansky and
Inman9 and conclude that overall these rules perform quite well with respect to
these compliance criteria, except with regard to enforcement. Generally, the
proposals for improvement try to address one or several of the criticisms
discussed above, although none of the proposals represent a Pareto improvement,
in that none of them solve all problems outlined above and may even aggravate
some of them (Buti et al., 2003a). Buiter and Grafe (2002) propose the ‘permanent
balance rule’ that takes into account different initial positions (debt level, stock of
public sector capital, stage of pension reform) and different future development
paths (GDP growth, inflation). The rule requires that the inflation-and-real-
growth-adjusted permanent government budget is in balance or in surplus. This
rule is attractive theoretically, but it requires estimating future growth and inflation
which could become a contentious issue and hence would be difficult to enforce.
Another analytically attractive proposed rule is the one that would consider the
fiscal stance of the euro area as a whole and would allocate “deficit shares” to
individual countries. These shares could be assigned by a decision of ECOFIN
(the French proposal)10, or by the markets through a system of tradable budget
deficit permits (Casella, 2001). The main arguments against such a scheme is that
the risks of triggering a financial crisis are not uniform across governments (Buti
et al. 2003a) and that the allocation of deficit shares, whether by
bureaucratic/political decision or by the markets, requires a degree of political
coordination and cooperation that seems to be lacking for the time being.
Other proposals aim at applying the “golden rule”, whereby investment
expenditure is excluded from the deficit calculation. Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2004) propose to exclude net investment (gross investment less depreciation)
from the deficit on the grounds that depreciation of public capital is equivalent to
current expenditure. The rationale for the golden rule is that borrowing should be
allowed to finance investments since their return will occur in the future and
hence their cost should be distributed over time. Excluding investment from the
deficit would remove the financial constraint on public investment under the SGP
and could also help avoid procyclical tightening of fiscal policy in a downturn.
Although intuitively appealing, the arguments advanced against the golden rule11
are that it is difficult to determine what constitutes investment, it could lead to a
bias in favor of physical assets, it would provide new incentives for creative
                                             
8 There is a review of the various proposals in Buti et al. (2003a) and also in HM Treasury (2004).
9 Kopits and Symansky (1998) and Inman (1996). See also Kopits (2001).
10 Proposal put forward by the Minister for Finance of France at the informal Ecofin Council in
Dresden in April 1999 (Buti et al., 2003a).
11 See, for instance, European Commission (2003) and Buti et al. (2003a).
9accounting, and that it could undermine the efforts to consolidate the public
finances.
A final set of proposals which we would like to mention deals with
institutional reforms. Wyplosz (2002) proposes to establish in each country Fiscal
Policy Committees entrusted with the responsibility to set annual deficit targets
consistent with long-run debt sustainability. Fatás et al. (2003) argue for the
creation of a Sustainability Council at the level of the euro area, with the task of
monitoring the sustainability of Member States’ public finances12. The idea behind
these proposals is to find in the fiscal area a counterpart to national central banks
or the ECB that could bring governments to better adhere to fiscal discipline. The
idea is appealing but a lot depends on the political will of elected governments to
respect more strictly the recommendations of the proposed national Fiscal Policy
Committees or the euro area Council than they currently respect the
recommendations of the Commission.
III. Fiscal Characteristics of the New Member States
The fiscal characteristics of the NMS have to be assessed from two
perspectives: (1) from the narrower perspective of meeting the numerical deficit
and debt Maastricht criteria on the road to euro adoption; and (2) from the
broader perspective of the SGP framework in the light of the criticisms of the
Pact and the proposed improvements discussed above. Although the issues are
linked, it is useful from a policy point of view to approach the assessment
separately from the above two perspectives. Such an assessment has to consider
the initial conditions faced by the NMS, as well as the challenges lying ahead. We
undertake this exercise by comparing the situation of the NMS with the
experiences of the current euro zone members.
1. The road to the euro
On their way toward adopting the euro, the NMS face the task of reducing
their fiscal deficits to the Maastricht criteria of 3 percent of GDP. Several NMS
have announced that they want to adopt the euro by 2008 or earlier, while others
plan to join later. On the whole, a distance of five years from euro adoption
appears to be a good benchmark to which to compare the starting positions of the
current euro zone members with the starting positions of the NMS. Figures shows
the deviation from the 3 percent deficit in 2003 for the NMS and five years prior
to the adoption of the euro for the current members (1996 for Greece and 1994
for the others). With the exception of Malta, the deviations for the NMS are about
the same or less than were the deviations for the majority of the current euro zone
members. The starting deficit conditions of the NMS are thus not worse than the
conditions faced by the current members five years prior to adopting the euro. In
fact, for the three Baltic states and Slovenia the conditions are significantly more
favorable. 
As regards government debt, it is generally lower in the NMS than it is in the
euro zone countries currently or five years prior to euro adoption (Figure 2.). The
                                             
12 Others, for instance Gros et al. (2004), have also made similar proposals.
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exceptions are Cyprus, Malta and Hungary. There are several reasons behind the
low debt levels in the NMS from Central and Eastern Europe. First, the Baltic
States did not inherit any of the liabilities of the former Soviet Union while Poland
obtained partial debt forgiveness. Second, some countries (e.g. Hungary) used
privatization receipts to reduce the government debt. Third, a part of the social
safety net expenditures were borne by state enterprises, most notably in the form
of within-the-gate unemployment. When these enterprises were privatized, the
new owner often took over their debts, which was then reflected in a lower
purchase price. There were also developments in the opposite direction, most
notably when the government assumed the debts of state-owned banks and
enterprises in order to consolidate them prior to privatization13.
The lower level of debt has implications for the way in which the fiscal
consolidation needed to reach the 3 percent Maastricht deficit criteria can be
achieved. Together with the greater convergence of bond yields already obtained
by the NMS (Figure 3.), the new member countries will be able to rely less on the
gains from interest rate convergence to reduce the deficit than were the current
euro zone countries (Figure 4.). During the last five years prior to euro adoption,
such gains represented between 2.4 to 5 percent of GDP in half of the current
euro zone members. Among the NMS, using the spot euro bond yield as
reference, only Hungary, Malta and Poland will have gains of between 1.3 and 2
percent of GDP, while all the others will have smaller gains. If we use the 2009
forward euro bond yield as reference, the gains will be even smaller14. The greater
convergence of bond yields in the NMS is a result of the progress with disinflation
and the markets’ expectations that these countries will adopt the euro in the not
too distant future, which have contributed to a reduction of the risk premia.
Another factor reducing the potential gains from yield convergence is that in some
of the NMS a large portion of the government debt is in foreign currency where
the scope for interest rate convergence is limited.
Figure 5. shows the required changes in the primary balance to reach the 3
percent Maastricht deficit limit. A negative value shows the required improvement
and a positive value the “permissible” deterioration. For the high-debt NMS
(Cyprus, Hungary, Malta) and the Czech Republic, the required improvements are
significantly higher than were necessary for most of the euro zone members,
owing to the smaller gains from yield convergence in the former. Only high-debt
Italy and France, where the yield convergence five years prior to euro adoption
was already nearly complete, needed primary balance improvements similar to
those of the above mentioned new members. In these latter countries, therefore,
most of the adjustment to reach the 3 percent limit will have to be made in the
primary balance.
This brings us to examine the size and composition of government spending
in the NMS. The adequate size of government spending is difficult to determine
since it depends on a country’s social preferences. One benchmark that can be
used to judge the relative size of government is per capita income: when incomes
                                             
13 P. Kiss and Szapáry (2000) review the impact of debt assumptions on Hungary’s public finances.
14 In estimating the gains for the NMS, we assumed that the debt/GDP ratios remain constant. The
interest rates used were 5-year eurobond spot and 2009 forward yields. The five year period overestimates
somewhat the average maturity of domestic debt of the NMS.
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rise, the demand for certain publicly provided services, such as education, R&D,
infrastructure services tend to increase so that low income countries might need
extra room to accommodate these higher expenditures as per capita incomes rise.
Figure 6. plots the level of government expenditure as a ratio of GDP against per
capita income on a purchasing power parity basis. What the Figure illustrates is
that in the Visegrád countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia)
the spending levels are about the same as in those EU members where the levels
of expenditure are the highest, even though the per capita income is much smaller
in the Visegrád countries. Thus, using per capita income as a benchmark, the
governments in these new member countries appear to be oversized. Von Hagen
(2004) comes to the same conclusion using regression analysis where, in addition
to per capita income, he also takes into consideration the openness of the
economy on the grounds that more open economies are more exposed to external
shocks and therefore need larger government sector as a buffer. It is necessary to
point out though that both per capita income and openness are imperfect
benchmarks to judge the adequacy of the size of the public sector, because they
ignore the important question of which sector, public or private, can provide most
efficiently the services.
The above findings about the level of expenditure in the NMS have to be
looked at in conjunction with the special needs for additional spending in these
countries. It is common wisdom that transition economies need to strengthen
their infrastructure. Since the early 1990s, average government investment has
been consistently higher in the Central and Eastern European transition countries
than in the EU (Figure 7.). This is normal, since the social marginal productivity of
infrastructural investment will tend to be higher in less developed countries. For
the period ahead, the transition countries will need to maintain a relatively high
level of public investment expenditure given their relatively low stock of public
capital.
Furthermore, EU accession will involve additional government expenditure
and some revenue loss for the new members, which will be offset only partly by
transfers from the EU. The net effect will be negative in the initial years of
membership due to the combination of the following main factors: (1) the new
members have to pay immediately after accession their contribution to the EU
common budget; (2) a part of the EU transfers to finance projects are channeled
directly to private sector recipients with no positive direct effect on the budget; (3)
those transfers that are channeled to the budget for project implementation have
to be pre-financed by the government; (4) the EU transfers cannot be used to
finance projects which, in the absence of the transfers, would have been financed
from the budget (the principle of additionality); (5) there is a domestic co-
financing requirement of EU-financed projects; (6) there will be increased
administrative burden associated with the implementation of EU financed
projects; and (7) the removal of custom duties on imports from EU members and
the sharing of customs receipts on imports from third countries involve a loss of
revenue. These negative effects will be partly compensated by the phasing out of
domestic agricultural subsidies which will be replaced by EU subsidies. 
Several authors have estimated the net direct budgetary effects of accession
(see Table 1.). All the authors have come up with a net negative direct effect on
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the budget during the first years of membership. The estimates range between 1
and 4.75 percent of GDP per year. The rather wide range of these estimates
reflects the differences in the underlying assumptions regarding absorption
capacity and the space and cost of financing the acquis communautaires, such as
environmental protection and infrastructure. These estimates concern only the
direct budgetary effects, which may be mitigated by favorable indirect effects that
are difficult to quantify, such as those resulting from accession-driven private
sector activity. However, these favorable effects will come on stream only
gradually and the assessment that accession will lead initially to a higher burden on
the budget is not questioned.
2. The SGP framework
Two issues are relevant from the perspective of the SGP framework: the
cyclical sensitivity of the budgets and debt sustainability.
a) Cyclical sensitivity
In the SGP framework, the automatic stabilizers are to be allowed to operate
fully without breaching the 3 percent deficit limit. The European Commission has
calculated cyclical safety margins for each of the EU-15 countries15, showing the
size of the deterioration in the budget balance in case output falls below potential.
Subtracting these safety margins from the reference value of 3 percent, we obtain
the so-called “minimal benchmark” which a country should at least achieve over
the cycle in order to avoid breaching the 3 percent limit in a downturn.
Using the methodology of the European Commission (2000), we calculated
the safety margins for the eight new members from Central and Eastern Europe
(CEEs) (Table 2:)16. Despite somewhat higher output volatilities17, the cyclical
safety margins are generally lower in the CEEs than in the EU-15, as a result of
lower sensitivity of the budgets of the CEEs to the economic cycle. The lower
sensitivity is explained essentially by the smaller reliance on cycle-sensitive direct
taxes and the significantly lower shares in total spending of cycle-sensitive
expenditures on unemployment benefits18. One reason for the smaller reliance on
direct taxes and the correspondingly higher reliance on indirect taxes is that tax
evasion has been a widespread problem in the CEEs and the collection of indirect
taxes has proved to be more efficient. Other reasons are tax holidays and the low
level of corporate taxes, which have been used as an incentive to attract foreign
                                             
15 European Commission (2000, 2002).
16 As discussed in the Annex, this methodology, which estimates the output gap by an HP-filtered
trend approach, has several weaknesses and has been improved by the Commission by using a production
function approach (European Commission, 2002). We used the former methodology because of the lack of
readily available production function calculations for the CEEs. For Hungary, P. Kiss and Vadas (2004)
estimate cyclical sensitivities and output gaps using three different methods: that of the European
Commission (2002), the ECB (Bouthevillain et al., 2001) and a methodology developed by the authors to
take into account the specific fiscal and economic characteristics of Hungary. For the sake of
comparability, we did not use the P. Kiss and Vadas (2004) estimates for Hungary.
17 See Darvas and Szapáry (2004) for a discussion of output volatilities in the euro area and the CEEs.
18 Direct taxes as a ratio of GDP averaged 14 percent in the EU-15 and 10 percent in the CEEs in the
period 1992-2002. Unemployment benefit payments to GDP averaged 1.73 percent in the EU-15 and 0.68
in the CEEs (Sources: AMECO and Riboud et al. 2002).
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investment. The smaller share of expenditures on unemployment compensation is
due to the generally less generous benefits.
The lower cyclical safety margins mean that the “minimal benchmark”, i.e. the
maximum deficit to be respected over the cycle without running the risk of
breaching the 3 percent limit, is higher in the CEEs19 than in the EU-1520. This
finding has to be looked at in conjunction with the smoothing capacity of the
automatic stabilizers. Many authors have researched and calculated the output
stabilization effects of automatic stabilizers in the euro area21. Calculating these
effects for the CEEs is beyond the scope of this paper and should be the subject
of future research. One factor which tends to weaken the smoothing capacity of
automatic stabilizers in the CEEs is that they are small open economies (except
Poland) where the smoothing capacity is reduced by the leakages through imports.
The lower cyclical budget sensitivity together with the openness of the CEEs
imply that these countries may have to rely more on discretionary measures to
smooth the economic cycle. There are, however, risks involved in using
discretionary changes and one has to ensure that the discretionary measures are
reversible and do not lead to a deterioration of the underlying budget position (see
European Commission, 2002).
b) Debt sustainability
As seen earlier, the debt levels in the NMS are generally lower than in the euro
area. As catching-up economies, they also have a higher potential growth rate, as
well as higher BS-induced inflation and hence lower real interest rates once they
have adopted the euro and face similar nominal interest rates. The combination of
these factors would, ceteris paribus, imply that the NMS could run higher deficits
and still maintain the long-run sustainability of public finances. However, when
assessing debt sustainability, one also has to take into account future liabilities.
The most important of these are future pension payment obligations and health
care outlays for the elderly due to population ageing.
As can be seen in Table 3., the old-age dependency ratios in the CEEs are
somewhat below those of the EU-15, but the fertility rates are also smaller which,
combined with an increase in life expectancy that will accompany the growth in
per capita income in the CEEs, will sharply raise the dependency ratios. In the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland these ratios are projected to double or more
than double by 2050. The burden that these population trends implies for the
government budgets can be reduced by reforming the pension systems, such as
introducing a second pillar funded scheme (but the transition cost of exiting from
the pay-as-you-go system remains), raising the level of retirement age, tightening
                                             
19 Our estimates of the cyclical safety margins of the budgets of the CEEs are fairly close to those
calculated by IMF (2004), but are substantially lower than those calculated by Coricelli and Ercolani (2002).
These authors estimate the safety margins for Hungary and Poland to be over 3 percent, mainly because
they find output to be more volatile. This may be due to the inclusion of the years 1990-94 which were
characterized by high transition-induced output volatility. For this reason, we excluded those years from
our calculations.
20 For the EU-15, the output gaps are those calculated by European Commission (2002) using the
more sophisticated production function methodology, while for the CEE-8 we used the HP-filtered trend
approach. The HP-filter approach yields even smaller minimal benchmarks for the EU-15.
21 Buti et al. (2003b); Buti and van den Noord (2003 and 2004); Brunila et al. (2002); European
Commission (2002); Barrell and Pina (2000); Kiander and Virén (2000); van den Noord (2000)
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eligibility for early retirement or reducing the replacement rate. About half of the
CEEs have already introduced a multi-pillar system and others plan to do so
(European Commission, 2003). A second element of future liabilities that can
burden the budgets of the CEEs in the years ahead is the overall stock of
guarantees granted mostly for enterprise borrowings in the sectors of public
transportation and energy. Although the stock of guarantees has been substantially
reduced as a result of privatization, it remains important in some countries.
It is difficult to judge the optimal target for public debt. It depends, as said, on
the crowding out effect of interest payments and the negative output effect of
distortionary taxes to finance these payments. Furthermore, it also depends on the
future rate of return of the expenditures that are financed by borrowing, such as
investments and reforms that benefit future generations, or reforms that reduce
future liabilities (e.g. pension reforms). IMF (2004) suggests a prudent public debt
ratio of around 45 percent of GDP for the CEEs. The UK Government’s fiscal
policy objective is to maintain net debt below 40 percent of GDP over the
economic cycle. Using these numbers as a benchmark for illustrative purposes –
but without suggesting that this is an appropriate debt level for all countries under
all circumstances – we show in Table 4. the improvement in the primary balances
needed to reach a 40 percent debt/GDP ratio within ten years in the CEEs. A
positive value in Table 4 shows in percent of GDP the size of the improvement in
the primary balance needed now and to be kept constant in order to reduce the
debt/GDP ratio to 40 percent in ten years in case the current level of debt
exceeds 40 percent, or the improvement needed in order not to exceed the limit in
case the current level of debt is less than 40 percent. A negative value indicates the
“permissible” deterioration in the primary balance without exceeding the debt
limit. As can be seen from Table 4, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Malta need significant improvements in the primary balances in order to avoid
that their debt levels exceed 40 percent of GDP by 2013. This is because both the
debt levels and the primary deficits are high in these countries. Poland and
Slovakia need only a small improvement, while the Baltic countries and Slovenia
could in principle let their primary balances deteriorate, since they have low debts
and low primary deficits or have surpluses.
3. Summary of findings
Our main findings regarding the fiscal characteristics of the NMS from the
perspective of the Maastricht criteria and the SGP can be summarized as follows.
There are large differences among the NMS as to their starting fiscal positions.
The budget deficits of the Baltic states and Slovenia were already smaller than 3
percent of GDP in 2003 and these countries have also the lowest debt/GDP
ratios among the NMS, well below 60 percent of GDP. Estonia scores the
highest, with practically no government debt and an overall budget surplus. Those
countries which have recorded the largest deficits in 2003, Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Malta, have also the highest debt levels. Clearly, the NMS
cannot be regarded as a group but have to be looked at on a case-by-case basis.
The new members, particularly those with less favorable starting fiscal
positions, face great challenges on the road to euro adoption because the potential
budgetary gains from yield convergence are limited and EU accession will have a
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net negative impact on their budgets in the initial years of accession. At the same
time, pension and other needed reforms, as well as the necessity to keep up with
the higher level of infrastructure investment, imply additional budgetary burdens. 
The level of debt is generally lower in the NMS than in the euro area. They
also have higher potential growth and will face lower real interest rates within the
euro zone due to the higher BS-induced inflation, which improve their prospects
of debt sustainability. However, they also face considerable budgetary pressures in
the medium to long-run because of the high stock of government guarantees in
some countries and ageing related future pension and health care payment
obligations. 
IV. Policy Implications
The main ideas that we would like to communicate in this paper which have a
policy implication are the following: 
1. From a debt sustainability perspective, the lower debt and the prospect of faster
growth implies that those NMS where the deficit is significantly below 3 percent
could be given a longer period of time to reach the ‘close to balance or in surplus’
position. This would be also justified because the NMS need more infrastructural
development and EU accession will put additional burden on the budgets in the
initial years of membership. We should remember that in the run-up to euro
adoption, the current cohesion countries were the recipients of much larger EU
transfers than what the NMS are expected to receive in the coming years. More
research should be undertaken to define debt sustainability taking also into
account future liabilities, so that more concrete guidelines could be issued for the
required speed of adjustment. 
It has been sometimes suggested that the SGP or its interpretation need to be
modified to take into account the special circumstances of the new Member
States. The large differences in the initial conditions of the NMS do not support
that argument. Indeed, several current euro zone members have lower debt than
some of the NMS and the less developed current euro zone members have also
higher potential growth rates than the other members. The improvement of the
SGP is needed not because of enlargement, but because it makes good economic
sense to take into account the differences in initial conditions for all countries.
Enlargement only highlights the need for improvement by widening the
differences among countries subject to the provisions of the SGP.
A misconception has to be corrected in this regard. In many documents and
declarations reference is made to the “equal treatment” of members when talking
about the uniform application of the provisions of the SGP. Equal treatment in an
economic sense would mean that one differentiates according to initial conditions
and future liabilities. Uniformity in this case is not equal treatment. One can,
therefore, support those suggested improvements in the SGP that would take into
account more explicitly differences in debt levels, economic growth, demographic
trends and reforms that reduce future liabilities.
2. There are good reasons for keeping the 3 percent limit even from the
perspective of the NMS, because those new members which exceed that limit are
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also those which have the highest debt levels. They have, therefore, an interest in
reducing the deficit to below 3 percent earlier rather than later so that they can
benefit from a reduction in debt service payments which would free resources for
other purposes  and that irrespective of when they plan to adopt the euro.
There is another reason why the high-deficit NMS have to reduce the fiscal
deficit. As long as they are not within the euro area, they are exposed to
speculative capital movements triggered by market perception about the
sustainability of the external payments position22. While the rate of investment in
the NMS will remain high, they also face the prospect of an erosion of net
household savings as a result of credit booms. Household credit is typically very
low in the CEEs and one can expect a rapid growth in such credit as a result of
the declining interest rates, the prospect of higher permanent income levels, and
the greater willingness of banks to lend to households as they move into retail
banking, an area which the banks have eschewed so far because of the higher
perceived risks. Hungary has already experienced a sharp reduction in net
household savings in recent years. Under these circumstances, the burden falls on
the budget to maintain an external position which is seen as viable by the markets.
If the cyclical upturn that has just started proves to be durable, this would be an
ideal time to accelerate the consolidation in the high-deficit NMS, thus reducing
the risk of having to pursue procyclical policy in a downturn. Since the
government sector in most high-debt NMS is already oversized relative to their
per capita income, consolidation should be done through cutting current primary
spending, while leaving room for those expenditures that are necessary for the
building up of the stock of public capital and for the implementation of reforms
that will bring long-term benefits. 
3. More emphasis should be placed on improvements in budgetary procedures.
Budgetary practices vary a great deal from one country to another: the forecasting,
planning, implementing, accounting and monitoring procedures are not the same.
Deficiencies in these areas can lead to forecasting errors and ex-post revisions of
data that make enforcement difficult and eventually undermine credibility.
Guidelines for best practices in budgetary procedures could be issued by the
Council and included in the monitoring under the SGP.
4. Finally, we have to remind ourselves that the Maastricht-related constraints
have led to a significant reduction in the deficits and debt levels of the current
euro zone members and there is no evidence that it has impaired the stabilization
role of fiscal policy or that it had negatively affected public investment (Gali and
Perotti, 2003). While rules are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the
single monetary policy, the need for rules goes beyond that: fiscal rules are
justified in their own rights as an instrument to foster budgetary discipline.
Markets will eventually penalize the sinners but markets react generally too late, by
which time the cost of adjustment is already high. Enlargement strengthens the
need for rules, since one can observe in several NMS mounting popular pressure
for relaxing fiscal policy as expectations have been heightened with EU accession
and the appetite for reforms has weakened. The rules have to be respected by all,
however. It will be difficult to muster the critically important political support in
                                             
22 Barnhill and Kopits (2003) discuss the fiscal vulnerabilities faced by emerging markets.
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the new Member States for the commitment to meet the 3 percent deficit
requirement to join the monetary union while current members continue to
breach that limit.
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ANNEX: The Calculation of Cyclical Safety Margins
The cyclical safety margins show the size of the deterioration in the budget
balance in case output falls short of potential output. Subtracting these safety
margins from the 3 percent reference value of the Maastricht Treaty, we obtain
the so-called “minimal benchmark”, which is the cyclically adjusted deficit
consistent with the 3 percent limit. The calculation of cyclical safety margins
consists of two steps: the calculation of the largest output gap that a country is
likely to encounter and the sensitivity of its budget to the economic cycle. The
budget sensitivity indicator is an elasticity of the budget deficit to the output gap,
calculated as a weighted average of elasticities of the following budget items: direct
taxes, indirect taxes and social security contributions on the revenue side, and
unemployment benefits on the expenditure side.
The largest value of output gap 
We followed the methodology used in European Commission (2000). The
output gap is obtained as the logarithmic difference of actual and trend output: 
tititi yyOG ˆ       (1)
where OGti stands for the output gap for the i-th country in period t, yti is the log of actual
output for country i in period t, and ŷti is the trend of log output y for the i-th country in
period t.
The largest output gap that country i is likely to face (GAPi) is calculated as a
combination of three sub-indicators: a) the absolute value of the largest negative
output gap recorded in country i over the whole sample period (1995-2002 in our
case); b) the unweighted average of the three largest negative output gaps in all
countries studied (the 10 new Member States in our case) over the whole sample
period; and c) the average volatility of the output gap in each new Member State,
measured as twice its standard deviation. The largest value for the output gap is
calculated as the mid-point of the worst two of these three sub-indicators. We
excluded from our calculations the years before 1995, a period of a transformation
recession when GDP fell sharply in the CEEs. 
The budget sensitivity indicator
The sensitivity of the budget (SENS) to the output gap is a weighted average
of the elasticities of budget items for each country:
ubscitdtSENS UBSCITDT   ,        (2)
where εDT, εIT, εSC, are the output elasticities of revenue from direct taxes, indirect
taxes and social security contributions; εUB is the output elasticity of unemployment
benefits, and dt, it, sc are the ratios of revenue received from direct taxes, indirect taxes
and social contributions to GDP. ub is the ratio of unemployment benefits to GDP.
Cyclical safety margins and minimal benchmarks
Cyclical safety margins (CSM) are calculated as a product of the largest output
gap and the budget sensitivity indicator:
iii SENSGAPCSM   (3)
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The value of CSM shows the extent to which the budget balance in a given
country is likely to deteriorate in times of severe economic downturn.
Finally, the minimal benchmark (MB) is the gap between the cyclical safety margin
and the Maastricht reference value of 3 percent: 
ii CSMMB  %3  (4)
The minimal benchmark shows the cyclically adjusted deficit consistent with
the 3 percent reference value.
Sources and description of data
The Commission uses annual GDP figures since 1960 for the calculation of
trend GDP and output gaps. In the Central and Eastern European countries, the
sample period is very short due to structural changes and severe transformation
recessions in the early nineties, so we took seasonally adjusted quarterly data since
1995 (on constant 1995 prices). For the sources of quarterly data refer to Darvas
and Szapáry (2004). Following the methodology of the Commission, we obtained
trend output using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with the standard parameter of
1600 for quarterly data23.
For the relative weight of each revenue item we used the AMECO database. As for
the expenditure side, in the absence of readily available data across countries for a
sufficiently long period of time, we used the data for unemployment benefits from
Riboud et al. (2002); for the output elasticity of unemployment benefits, we used the
estimate for the Czech Republic calculated by the Czech Ministry of Finance which can
be regarded as an approximation of the elasticities in the CEEs.
Assumptions and limitations of the methodology
There are some implicit assumptions in the Commission’s methodology of
calculating cyclical safety margins which limit its applicability and require caution
when interpreting the results, as pointed out also by the Commission itself.
Namely, constant values are assumed for (1) the share of the relevant budget items
in the total budget (in our case these were 10-year averages); (2) the cyclical
elasticities of the relevant budget items; and (3) the structure of GDP so that a 1
percentage point change in output gap is assumed to affect all tax bases in the
same way24. We did not attempt to estimate the income elasticities of the revenue
items due to the shortage of readily available data. Instead, we assumed that they
are equal to one. This is very close to the average value estimated for the OECD
countries (see van den Noord, 2000).
                                             
23 European Commission (2000) calculated the output gap as a deviation of output from trend
obtained using the HP-filter. However, in its latest calculation (European Commission, 2002), the
Commission estimated potential output using the production functions approach.
24 This assumption was relaxed in the more sophisticated approach of Bouthevillain et al. (2001).
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Figures
Figure 1. Deviations from the Maastricht Deficit Criterion of 3 Percent of GDP
Prior to euro adoption*
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Source: EUROSTAT and Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic
                                             
* For the euro zone members, five years prior to euro adoption: 1996 for Greece and 1994 for the
other members. For the new Member States, the data refer to 2003. General government net borrowing as
a ratio of GDP on the basis of ESA95. The figure for the Czech Republic does not include debt
assumptions.
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Figure 2. Debt Ratios Prior to euro adoption and in 2003*
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* For the euro zone members, in 2003 and five years prior to euro adoption: 1996 for Greece and
1994 for the other members. For the new Member States, the data refer to 2003. General government
consolidated budget debt as a ratio of GDP.
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Figure 3. Bond Yield Convergence in the Run-Up to euro adoption and Scope for
Convergence in the New Member States*
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* For euro zone countries, convergence criterion bond yields: the difference in yields between March
1995 and March 2000 for Greece and between March 1993 and March 1998 for the other euro zone
countries. For new Member States, the difference between domestic convergence criterion bond yields and
the convergence criterion euro bond yield in January 2004.
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Figure 4. Gains in Interest Payments due to Bond Yield Convergence in the Run-
Up to euro adoption*
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* For the euro zone countries, interest rate convergence gains during 1995-2000 for Greece and
during 1993-1998 for the other euro zone members. The calculations were made on the basis of the end of
period debt/GDP ratios. The gains thus calculated do not necessarily correspond to the actual
improvements in the interest payment balances because of changes in the debt/GDP ratios during the
period considered. For the new Member States, the calculations were based on 5-year euro bond spot and
2009 forward yields; constant debt/GDP ratios were assumed up to 2009.
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Figure 5. Required Improvements in the Primary Balances to Reach the
Maastricht Deficit Criterion of 3 Percent Taking Account of Gains from Bond
Yield Convergence*
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* See footnote for Figure 4. A negative value shows the required improvement and a positive value the
„permissible” deterioration in the primary balance in order to meet the 3 percent deficit limit.
28
Figure 6.Per Capita Income and Government Spending in the EU and the CEEs,
1998-2003 averages*
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* Luxembourg and Slovenia are not included.
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Figure 7. Average Government Investment Ratios in the EU-15 and the CEEs*,
1993-2003
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* Slovenia is not included. Figures are unweighted averages. Data for 2003 are preliminary.
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Tables
Table 1. Net Budgetary Effect of EU Accession
Authors Net Annual Negative Effect (percent of GDP)
Kopits and Székely (2004) 3 - 4.75
Antczak (2003) 1.7 – 3.1
IMF (2004) 1.0 – 1.5
31
Table 2: Cyclical Budget Sensitivity and Minimal Benchmarks
in percent in percent in percent
EU-15 0.50 3.83 1.97 -1.03
Austria 0.30 5.17 0.90 -2.10
Belgium 0.60 3.83 2.30 -0.70
Denmark 0.80 5.14 2.70 -0.30
Finland 0.70 3.00 3.80 0.80
France 0.40 3.25 1.30 -1.70
Germany 0.50 3.38 1.40 -1.60
Greece 0.40 5.43 1.30 -1.70
Ireland 0.35 3.75 1.70 -1.30
Italy 0.45 3.25 1.50 -1.50
Luxembourg 0.60 4.86 3.10 0.10
Netherlands 0.65 3.33 2.30 -0.70
Portugal 0.35 3.54 1.80 -1.20
Spain 0.40 2.80 1.50 -1.50
Sweden 0.70 3.14 2.20 -0.80
United Kingdom 0.50 3.60 1.80 -1.20
CEE-8 0.41 4.26 1.68 -1.32
Czech Republic 0.40 4.20 1.70 -1.30
Estonia 0.41 4.78 1.95 -1.05
Hungary 0.44 3.65 1.62 -1.38
Latvia 0.33 4.22 1.39 -1.61
Lithuania 0.33 6.05 2.01 -0.99
Poland 0.49 3.87 1.88 -1.12
Slovakia 0.40 3.87 1.55 -1.45
Slovenia 0.45 3.44 1.54 -1.46
Cyclical Safety 
Margin
Minimal 
Benchmark
Cyclical Budget 
Sensitivity
The Largest Value 
of Output Gap
Sources: EU-15: European Commission (2002); CEE-8: see Annex.
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Table 3. Dependency Ratios and Fertility Rates*
2000 2050 2003
EU-15 25.95 51.40 1.57
Belgium 28.10 49.50 1.62
Denm ark 24.20 40.30 1.72
G erm any 26.60 53.20 1.31
G reece n.a. n.a. 1.25
Spain 27.10 65.70 1.25
France 27.20 50.80 1.89
Ireland 19.70 45.70 1.97
Italy 28.80 66.80 1.26
Luxem bourg n.a. n.a. 1.63
Netherlands 21.90 44.90 1.73
Austria 25.20 58.20 1.40
Portugal 26.70 50.90 1.47
F inland 25.90 50.60 1.72
Sweden 29.40 46.30 1.65
United K ingdom 26.60 45.30 1.64
NM S-10 22.00 53.30 1.29
Cyprus n.a. n.a. 1.49
Czech Republic 21.90 57.50 1.17
Estonia n.a. n.a. 1.37
Hungary 23.70 47.20 1.30
Latvia n.a. n.a. 1.24
Lithuania n.a. n.a. 1.24
M alta n.a. n.a. 1.46
Poland 20.40 55.20 1.24
Slovak ia n.a. n.a. 1.19
Slovenia n.a. n.a. 1.21
O ld-age Dependency Ratios 
(in percent)
Total Fertility 
Rate
Sources: OECD (2003) and EUROSTAT
                                             
* Old-age dependency ratio is equal to (persons aged 65+)/(persons aged 20-64). Total fertility rate is
defined as the average number of children who would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime. In
more developed countries, a rate of 2.1 is considered to be replacement level.
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Table 4. Primary Deficit Gaps to Reach 40 percent Debt/GDP Ratios in Ten
Years under Different Assumptions for Growth and Real Interest Rates (In
percent of GDP)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EUROSTAT data
Cyprus
GDP-growth 2% 4%
3% 5.66 6.78
4% 5.12 6.22
5% 4.59 5.67
Real interest rates
Czech Rep.
GDP-growth 2% 4%
3% 3.08 3.84
4% 2.72 3.46
5% 2.35 3.09
Real interest rates
Estonia
GDP-growth 2% 4%
3% -6.53 -6.12
4% -6.74 -6.32
5% -6.95 -6.52
Real interest rates
Hungary
GDP-growth 2% 4%
3% 3.21 4.19
4% 2.74 3.70
5% 2.27 3.22
Real interest rates
Latvia
GDP-growth 2% 4%
3% -1.70 -1.12
4% -1.99 -1.41
5% -2.28 -1.70
Real interest rates
Lithuania
GDP-growth 2% 4%
3% -1.80 -1.28
4% -2.06 -1.54
5% -2.32 -1.79
Real interest rates
Malta
GDP-growth 2% 4%
3% 8.64 9.76
4% 8.10 9.20
5% 7.58 8.65
Real interest rates
Poland
GDP-growth 2% 4%
3% 1.12 1.96
4% 0.72 1.54
5% 0.32 1.13
Real interest rates
Slovakia
GDP-growth 2% 4%
3% 1.08 1.88
4% 0.68 1.48
5% 0.30 1.08
Real interest rates
Slovenia
GDP-growth 2% 4%
3% -1.71 -3.93
4% -2.03 -4.10
5% -2.34 -4.27
Real interest rates
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